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The purpose of our project was to examine the behavior of actively managed credit hedge funds and mutual funds. We asked: Do actively managed credit funds deliver alpha, or are 
excess-of-benchmark returns simply exposures to traditional risk 
premiums? Ultimately, an investor should care about receiving posi-
tive excess-of-benchmark returns that are uncorrelated with whatever 
else is in the investor’s portfolio. If an asset owner allocates to a hedge 
fund, the aim is to gain access to returns that are not correlated with 
traditional risk premiums (e.g., the Equity risk premium, Credit risk 
premium, and Treasury risk premium). Ideally, a full-fee hedge fund 
investment vehicle should hedge out market exposures (see, e.g., 
Asness, Krail, and Liew 2001). Similarly, if an asset owner allocates to 
an actively managed long-only fund, the aim is to gain access to both 
the traditional risk premiums embedded in the benchmark (e.g., the 
Credit risk premium) and active (excess-of-benchmark) returns that are 
not correlated with traditional risk premiums.
We examined the returns and holdings of credit hedge funds and 
high-yield (HY) credit mutual funds to assess whether actively 
managed credit funds deliver active returns that are uncorrelated with 
traditional risk premiums. Our analysis made use of a comprehensive 
set of 219 credit hedge funds covered in the live and graveyard files 
of Hedge Fund Research (HFR) and 96 mutual funds benchmarked to 
a HY corporate bond index covered by both Lipper (holdings data) and 
Morningstar (return data). We were able to analyze the excess returns 
for both sets of actively managed credit funds, but we could conduct 
holdings-based analysis only for the credit mutual funds, for which 
we had access to periodic portfolio holdings information. Our analy-
sis covers the time period from January 1997 through June 2018—a 
sample of 258 months for the return analysis and 86 quarters for the 
holdings analysis.
We conducted two sets of analyses. First, we examined the betas of 
actively managed credit funds in relation to traditional risk premi-
ums. Specifically, we considered whether the excess-of-cash returns 
Extensive research has explored 
the style exposures of actively 
managed equity funds. We con-
ducted an exhaustive set of return-
based and holdings-based analyses 
to understand actively managed 
credit funds. We found that credit 
long–short managers tend to 
have high passive exposure to the 
credit risk premium. In contrast, 
we found that long-only managers 
that focus on high-yield credits 
provide less exposure to the 
credit risk premium than do their 
respective benchmarks. For both 
credit hedge funds and long-only 
credit mutual funds, we found that 
neither has economically meaning-
ful exposures to well-compensated 
systematic factors.
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of credit hedge funds exhibit any correlation with 
traditional risk premiums and whether the excess-
of-benchmark returns of actively managed credit 
long-only funds exhibit any correlation with tradi-
tional risk premiums. We found in both cases no cor-
relation, and the strength of this result is sobering. 
Credit hedge funds, like their equity siblings, provide 
meaningful (passive) exposure to traditional risk 
premiums. For example, across our 219 credit hedge 
funds, we found that nearly 50% of the median man-
ager’s time-series variation in excess-of-cash returns 
can be explained by passive exposure to traditional 
market risk premiums (covering Equity, Credit, and 
Treasury risk premiums). HY credit mutual funds, 
in contrast, provide less credit exposure than the 
benchmark. We found that across our 96 HY credit 
funds, excess-of-benchmark returns had a negative 
correlation (–0.25) with the Credit risk premium, sug-
gesting that the typical HY credit mutual fund is run 
with a beta of 0.94 with respect to the benchmark.1 
Some investors may prefer a beta different from 1, 
but in any case, being aware of, and paying care-
ful attention to, the beta exposure in one’s actively 
managed credit allocation is important. In the case of 
credit hedge funds, the investor is probably getting 
too much passive credit exposure, and in the case of 
HY credit mandates, the investor is probably get-
ting too little. The alternative, however, is to ensure 
that portfolio positions are ex ante beta neutral for 
credit hedge funds and ex ante beta equal to 1 for 
long-only funds.2
Second, we examined whether recently docu-
mented systematic investment approaches (see, e.g., 
Houweling and van Zundert 2017; Israel, Palhares, 
and Richardson 2018) were able to explain variations 
in excess-of-cash returns of credit hedge funds or 
excess-of-benchmark returns of actively managed 
credit long-only funds. Alternatively stated, the 
question is: Can a systematic approach to harvesting 
alternative risk premiums (e.g., valuation, momentum, 
carry, and defensive factors) provide returns that are 
uncorrelated with the returns of incumbent active 
credit managers?3 It can, and the strength of this result 
is encouraging. Systematic approaches to investing are 
commonplace in equity markets, but until relatively 
recently, research exploring cross-sectional drivers of 
returns in fixed-income markets was limited, particu-
larly so for corporate credit. With (1) the growth of the 
corporate bond market itself, (2) the accessibility of 
data, and (3) an awareness of the applicability of sys-
tematic approaches to fixed-income markets, that pat-
tern is changing. Although recent papers (e.g., Correia, 
Richardson, and Tuna 2012; Chordia, Goyal, Nozawa, 
Subrahmanyam, and Tong 2017; Houweling and van 
Zundert 2017; Israel et al. 2018) have documented 
pervasive evidence of predictability in the cross-
section of corporate bond returns, we still know little 
about the behavior of actively managed credit hedge 
funds and mutual funds.
For our sample of 219 credit hedge funds, both 
individually and in aggregate, we found that excess-
of-cash returns exhibited low correlations with 
systematic valuation, momentum, carry, and defen-
sive factors. Specifically, between 7% and 12% of the 
variation in excess-of-cash returns can be explained 
by these systematic exposures. Similarly, for our 
sample of 96 HY credit mutual funds, both individu-
ally and in aggregate, we found that only 2% of the 
variation in excess-of-benchmark returns can be 
explained by systematic exposures.
For a set of 154 credit mutual funds, we comple-
mented the active return analysis with a thorough 
examination of holdings. Similar to what we observed 
in the return analysis, we found credit mutual fund 
active weights to be only slightly correlated, both 
individually and in aggregate, with systematic factor 
attributes. Specifically, the correlations of credit 
mutual fund manager active weights with standard-
ized scores of attractiveness based on measures of 
valuation, momentum, carry, and defensive factors 
are all close to zero (i.e., we found no evidence of an 
active tilt toward systematic investment themes). 
Not surprisingly, a portfolio that is designed to target 
these systematic factor attributes can generate a 
much larger economic exposure to those attributes.
Like our first result regarding credit beta, this finding 
has a clear implication for investors. An allocation 
to a systematic credit manager together with a 
traditional discretionary active credit manager has 
the potential to be a powerful diversifier. Neither 
systematic nor discretionary approaches are, or even 
need to be, inherently superior. If both are well 
executed and charge fair fees, they may complement 
each other well in an overall active credit mandate. 
Our analysis suggests that excess-of-benchmark 
return correlations between systematic and discre-
tionary managers are low, and excess-of-benchmark 
weights also exhibit low correlations.
Our article adds to the long line of research on fund 
manager performance. Most studies have focused 
on equity-oriented funds, but our research was 
conducted entirely on credit-oriented funds. We are 
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aware of only a small number of papers that have 
examined the returns or holdings of actively man-
aged bond funds. Of that research, all the papers 
examined a combination of government bond and 
corporate bond funds with a primary focus on return 
decomposition. For example, Kahn and Lemmon 
(2015) examined 121 fixed-income funds over a 
two-year period and found that, on average, two 
beta factors—duration and credit—explain about 
67% of the time variation in their returns. Moneta 
(2015) and Cici and Gibson (2012) decomposed bond 
fund returns with a view to assessing market-timing 
ability and/or bond selection ability beyond rating 
and maturity profiles. Choi and Kronlund (2018) 
found evidence that bond funds tilt their portfolio 
weights to higher-yield securities when the yield 
curve is low and flat. Finally, Fung and Hsieh (2002, 
2006) showed that the first principal component 
for 20 high-yield hedge funds explains nearly 70% 
of the time-series variation of their returns, which 
is consistent with a strong market loading (primarily 
explained by changes in aggregate credit spreads). 
Although these past papers examined the returns of 
actively managed bond funds, none of them cleanly 
answered the questions as to (1) whether excess-
of-benchmark returns are additive to traditional 
market risk premiums and (2) whether the holdings 
of actively managed bond funds can be explained by 
systematic factor attributes.
We greatly extend this past research along several 
dimensions. Most actively managed mutual funds 
and even some hedge funds have mandates to 
provide both beta and active management. We 
carefully disentangled the two by showing, first, the 
importance of traditional risk premiums in explain-
ing active credit manager fund returns and, second, 
the lack of importance of alternative risk premiums 
(value, momentum, carry, and defensive) in explaining 
active credit manager fund returns or holdings. We 
also expand both the time series and cross-section of 
actively managed credit funds covered. In addition, 
whereas most studies have focused only on returns, 
we also studied holdings, thus increasing the power 
of our analysis.
The key findings in our article are as follows. First, 
actively managed credit hedge funds and credit 
mutual funds differ substantially in their Credit risk 
premium exposures. Credit hedge funds provide too 
much exposure, when arguably they are supposed to 
hedge out traditional market risk premiums. Credit 
mutual funds provide too little exposure. In both 
cases, the implication for investors is to pay attention 
to the traditional market risk premiums embedded in 
their active credit manager allocations and, further-
more, to make sure that the fees they pay for that 
traditional market risk are appropriate (i.e., low).
Second, both actively managed credit hedge funds 
and credit mutual funds fail to provide any economi-
cally meaningful exposure to well-compensated 
systematic factors. This is not to say that a tradi-
tional discretionary approach to risk taking in credit 
markets is inferior. Rather, the implications for asset 
owners are that there is more than one way to skin 
a cat and that a well-executed portfolio that targets 
exposures to well-compensated alternative risk pre-
miums (e.g., value, momentum, carry, and defensive) 
may provide powerful diversification benefits to an 
overall credit allocation.
Data and Methodology
In this section, we discuss our hedge fund data, the 
HY credit mutual fund data, and the initial return 
analysis for both sets of data.
Credit Hedge Fund Data and Initial Return 
Analysis. For our empirical analysis of actively 
managed credit hedge funds, we obtained our data 
from the HFR Index (HFRI). For our time-series 
analysis of the beta and systematic exposures of 
actively managed credit hedge funds, we used the 
HFRI Relative Value: Fixed Income-Corporate Index. 
We obtained monthly hedge fund index return 
data from January 1997 through June 2018. We 
limited ourselves to individual funds within this 
HFR category that clearly took active risk in credit-
sensitive assets. Specifically, we read the investment 
philosophy of each credit hedge fund and limited 
ourselves to funds that primarily focused on security 
selection within public credit markets. Of the 446 
hedge funds within the HFRI Relative Value: Fixed 
Income-Corporate category, we removed 174 funds 
that focused on loans or had a focus outside the 
United States (our return data are all based on 
US corporate bonds). We then removed a further 
53 funds that had less than 24 months of return data. 
The final sample of 219 funds accounts for 72% of 
the total assets managed within the HFRI Relative 
Value: Fixed Income-Corporate category. The 227 
excluded funds tended to be small; average assets 
under management (AUM) of the excluded funds 
was $120 million, compared with $265 million for 
the 219 included funds. Notably, our key finding of 
a strong correlation between excess-of-cash returns 
 Looking under the Hood of Active Credit Managers
Volume 76 Number 2  85
and the Credit risk premium was also seen for these 
smaller funds, which had shorter track records or 
did not focus on corporate credit. Across the set of 
227 excluded funds, the median correlation between 
excess-of-cash returns and the credit excess returns 
of a diversified HY index was 0.57, compared with 
0.61 for the 219 included funds (the full results are 
discussed in the section “Detailed Return Analysis of 
Credit Hedge Funds”). We used net-of-fee monthly 
return data for individual hedge funds. To minimize 
survivorship bias, we examined both funds currently 
operating and funds that had fallen out of their 
respective index return series. The average credit 
hedge fund existed for 81 months.
Table 1, Panel A, summarizes the performance 
(excess-of-cash returns) of the credit hedge funds 
in our sample. Over this time period, the average 
credit hedge fund reported annualized net-of-fee and 
net-of-cash returns of nearly 4%. Figure 1, Panel A, 
shows the distribution of annualized net-of-fee and 
net-of-cash returns of the 219 individual credit hedge 
funds. The distribution is notably to the right of zero, 
and the average Sharpe ratio across the 219 funds 
is 0.79. At first glance, credit hedge funds appear to 
have delivered excellent excess-of-cash returns. The 
purpose of this article is to examine the source of 
these excess-of-cash returns.
Table 1. Active Returns of Actively Managed Credit Funds, January 1997–June 2018
Year N Mean
Percentile
Std. Dev.10 25 50 75 90
A. Credit hedge funds
1997 31 8.81% –3.36% –0.23% 1.75% 6.57% 11.90% 26.32%
1998 35 –7.66 –56.05 –30.96 –6.95 –2.27 1.55 5.66
1999 41 4.35 –30.84 –3.56 –1.95 2.49 9.00 30.49
2000 41 –1.19 –36.33 –16.88 –6.67 0.50 4.69 16.52
2001 42 2.93 –28.87 –18.49 0.07 3.37 6.04 16.17
2002 60 7.69 –8.84 –0.30 1.37 4.96 11.37 21.21
2003 75 13.23 –0.21 1.26 5.24 10.68 19.78 30.26
2004 86 6.22 –3.15 –0.33 2.34 5.33 8.41 13.83
2005 88 2.64 –5.63 –4.07 –0.76 0.62 4.37 8.35
2006 84 3.09 –9.63 –5.45 –1.50 2.75 5.51 11.95
2007 76 0.74 –18.08 –12.22 –3.18 1.37 5.50 18.23
2008 83 –22.92 –73.11 –62.92 –33.36 –22.11 0.69 15.05
2009 82 25.20 –16.21 –3.06 12.58 23.43 36.31 51.86
2010 88 11.44 –1.89 0.80 5.42 9.92 15.10 22.57
2011 86 1.73 –8.78 –5.89 –1.62 1.35 4.46 9.26
2012 92 10.42 –3.45 3.86 6.69 10.33 14.65 18.44
2013 91 6.24 –4.52 –0.86 2.37 7.10 9.55 14.30
2014 89 2.70 –5.33 –3.27 0.41 2.50 4.73 7.68
2015 88 –1.37 –13.32 –10.17 –5.40 –0.73 2.72 5.82
2016 91 8.79 –0.46 1.56 3.78 6.17 12.61 16.55
2017 91 4.82 –3.35 –0.83 2.33 4.45 7.47 10.16
2018 91 –1.28 –12.33 –9.23 –3.60 –1.70 2.68 5.58
Avg. 74 3.94 –15.63 –8.24 –0.94 3.50 9.05 17.10
(continued)
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Active HY Credit Mutual Fund Data and 
Initial Return Analysis. For our empirical 
analysis of actively managed credit mutual funds, 
we obtained the data from Morningstar Direct. 
Specifically, we selected mutual funds in the 
Morningstar database with an explicit HY bench-
mark from one of the two most popular benchmark 
providers: Bank of America Merrill Lynch (BAML) and 
Barclays. Through this process, we identified 182 
credit mutual funds. We further filtered the dataset 
by requiring mutual funds to have at least three years 
of return history, to manage at least $50 million in 
corporate bond holdings in a reporting quarter, and 
to hold at least 80% of their corporate bond portfolio 
in US HY bonds. This last filter is important because 
some benchmarked credit mutual funds hold nontriv-
ial positions in noncorporate bond assets (e.g., loans 
and equities). These positions can distort a mutual 
fund’s excess-of-benchmark returns and introduce 
noise into a return analysis. After these filters were 
Year N Mean
Percentile
Std. Dev.10 25 50 75 90
B. Credit mutual funds
1996 23 2.43% –1.79% –0.02% 1.86% 3.38% 8.45% 2.12%
1997 43 0.69 –1.22 –0.32 0.45 1.96 2.92 1.84
1998 53 –0.07 –4.11 –2.18 –0.54 1.66 3.50 3.67
1999 59 1.64 –2.91 0.13 2.04 4.67 6.71 2.00
2000 62 –1.14 –9.36 –4.01 –0.95 2.53 6.88 2.65
2001 66 –2.96 –7.84 –5.26 –2.04 0.25 2.16 3.18
2002 69 –1.12 –6.82 –3.96 –0.47 2.32 4.61 4.09
2003 71 –3.14 –7.32 –6.05 –3.46 –0.48 1.93 2.02
2004 74 –0.46 –2.74 –1.57 –0.55 0.08 1.25 1.27
2005 78 –0.18 –1.40 –0.74 –0.19 0.59 1.19 1.22
2006 82 –0.82 –2.45 –1.85 –0.64 0.14 0.90 0.81
2007 85 –0.39 –1.50 –0.82 –0.22 0.53 1.19 1.08
2008 84 0.14 –5.70 –2.96 1.01 5.22 7.63 4.24
2009 84 –6.44 –15.25 –8.74 –5.60 –2.00 0.70 4.06
2010 83 –0.65 –2.74 –1.72 –0.78 0.37 1.41 1.27
2011 85 –1.17 –3.12 –2.00 –0.93 –0.22 0.73 1.43
2012 88 –0.52 –2.37 –1.46 –0.57 0.50 1.78 0.98
2013 87 –0.04 –1.99 –1.10 –0.35 0.52 1.99 0.78
2014 85 –1.08 –3.07 –2.00 –0.89 –0.14 0.93 0.95
2015 85 –0.05 –2.99 –1.20 0.20 1.69 2.81 1.20
2016 84 –2.42 –4.92 –3.74 –2.49 –1.05 0.20 1.68
2017 84 –0.50 –1.69 –1.22 –0.44 0.04 0.80 0.73
2018 84 –0.67 –2.23 –1.32 –0.73 –0.01 0.54 0.74
Avg. 74 –0.82 –4.15 –2.35 –0.71 0.98 2.66 1.91
Notes: The dataset used in Panel A consists of 219 US-centric credit hedge funds in the HFRI. The dataset used in Panel B consists 
of 96 HY corporate bond mutual funds in our Morningstar sample. Active return is defined as return in excess of cash for hedge 
funds and return in excess of the reporting benchmark for mutual funds.
Table 1.  Active Returns of Actively Managed Credit Funds, January 1997–June 2018 
(continued)
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Figure 1. Distribution of Net-of-Fee and Excess-of-Benchmark Returns across Individual 
Actively Managed Credit Funds, January 1997–June 2018
Number of Funds
A. Credit Hedge Funds
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Less –15.0 –9.0 –3.0 3.0 15.0 More9.0
Average Monthly Hedge Fund Excess-of-Cash Return (%)
Number of Funds
B. Credit Mutual Funds
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Less –3.0 –1.8 –0.6 0.6 1.8 3.0
Average Monthly Mutual Fund Excess-of-Benchmark Return (%)
Normal (0, Std. Dev.)Fund Distribuon
Credit Mutual FundsCredit Hedge Funds
Excess Return Volality Sharpe Rao Acve Return Volality Informaon Rao
 3.43% 7.46% 0.79
 2.04 5.80 1.08
 –3.74 2.46 –0.42
 10.87 13.84 1.87
 –0.95%  2.66% –0.34 
 0.35  1.36 0.35 
 –1.99  1.58 –0.75 
 0.18  3.56 0.07 
Mean
Std. Dev.
10th Percenle
90th Percenle
Notes: The sample is 219 (96) credit hedge (mutual) funds for the period. Panel A (Panel B) shows credit hedge (mutual) funds. The 
green line in each graph shows a normal distribution with mean of zero and standard deviation equal to that of the average return 
distribution. The table below the graphs shows the full-sample distribution of annualized returns for the credit hedge (mutual) funds. 
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applied, 96 actively managed credit mutual funds 
remained.4 The included funds represent 60% of the 
total assets managed by credit mutual funds in the 
Morningstar Direct database. The 86 excluded funds 
tended to be smaller (average AUM of $907 million 
compared with an average AUM of $1,361 million 
for the 96 included funds). Both total return and 
excess-of-benchmark return data were provided by 
Morningstar. Similar to our credit hedge fund data, 
these returns are net of all fees and are available at 
a monthly frequency from January 1997 through 
June 2018. The average credit mutual fund exists for 
226 months.
We focus here on HY benchmarked credit mutual 
funds instead of investment-grade (IG) benchmarked 
managers because (1) the dedicated IG credit mutual 
funds are fewer than the HY funds and (2) those that 
are benchmarked to IG corporate indexes tend to 
hold a broader set of assets than simply corporate 
bonds, making any return- or holdings-based attri-
bution inherently noisier. Past research also noted 
these important differences. For example, Choi and 
Kronlund (2018) examined both IG and HY funds and 
found that only 35% of holdings of IG benchmarked 
managers are corporate bonds, whereas for HY 
funds, this portion is closer to 75%. Cici and Gibson 
(2012) examined IG and HY funds and found a similar 
low level of corporate bond holdings for IG funds 
(average around 50%).
Table 1, Panel B, summarizes the performance 
(excess-of-benchmark returns) of long-only HY credit 
mutual funds in our sample. Unlike the credit hedge 
funds, over this time period, the average credit 
mutual fund reported annualized net-of-fee and net-
of-benchmark returns of –0.82%. Panel B of Figure 1 
reports the distribution of monthly net-of-fee and 
net-of-benchmark returns of our sample of 96 indi-
vidual credit mutual funds. Whereas for credit hedge 
funds the distribution is shifted to the right of zero, 
the distribution for credit mutual funds is notably 
shifted to the left of zero. The average information 
ratio across the 96 funds is negative, –0.34. Our 
purpose in this article is to look beyond this head-
line result and assess whether credit mutual funds 
are providing adequate exposure to the traditional 
risk premiums embedded in the benchmark and/or 
exposure to well-compensated systematic factors.
For the holdings analysis of actively managed credit 
mutual funds, we obtained holdings data from the 
Lipper eMAXX corporate bond database. We did 
not need to be as strict with the selection criteria 
for credit funds as we were for the return analysis. 
For the return analysis, we required at least 80% 
of holdings to be in corporate bonds to avoid the 
returns of other assets contaminating our analysis of 
exposure to the credit market or systematic credit 
factors. For the holdings analysis, we included a 
broad set of credit funds and rescaled the weights 
on the corporate bond portion of the portfolio to 
sum to 1. We thus used a larger, less restrictive 
set of 146 mutual funds previously selected from 
Morningstar. We continued to require minimum cor-
porate bond holdings of $50 million. We also added 
the 8 largest funds indexed to a BAML or Barclays 
benchmark that were in the Lipper eMAXX database 
but were not included in Morningstar. To select these 
8 funds, we identified the largest 100 corporate 
bond funds by AUM (those holding more HY bonds 
than IG bonds) and removed all funds that (1) were 
already covered in our Morningstar sample, (2) were 
passive, and (3) did not have a stated corporate bond 
benchmark. Only 8 bond funds passed these filters. 
Our total sample was 154 funds. The Lipper eMAXX 
holdings data are available at a quarterly frequency 
from January 1998 through June 2018. The aver-
age fund in our sample had 36 quarters of holdings 
data and approximately $600 million held in cor-
porate bonds, of which 96% were in US HY bonds.
Results
This section reports the detailed return analysis of 
credit hedge funds and of HY credit long-only funds. 
These discussions are followed by an analysis of the 
holdings of HY credit long-only funds. 
Detailed Return Analysis of Credit Hedge 
Funds. We noted previously that the average credit 
hedge fund had positive net-of-cash returns and a 
Sharpe ratio of 0.79. But how much of that result 
is simply attributable to passive exposure to the 
credit market itself? Asness et al. (2001) made the 
point that hedge funds in general—and equity hedge 
funds in particular—contain a lot of passive exposure 
to the equity market. Little research, however, has 
documented how pervasive this phenomenon is for 
credit hedge funds. For our return decomposition 
analysis, we used overlapping three-month returns. 
This choice was deliberate to mitigate concerns of 
potential staleness in reported fund returns that 
might dampen any measured correlations or vola-
tilities. Where we report t-statistics, we explicitly 
account for potential dependence introduced by 
overlapping three-month returns (by using the 
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standard Newey–West correction). Figure 2, Panel A, 
is a scatterplot showing the contemporaneous cor-
relation between the excess-of-cash (and net-of-fee) 
returns of an equally weighted basket of credit hedge 
funds and the credit excess returns of a diversified 
HY corporate bond index (both measured in over-
lapping three-month return windows). A positive 
relationship is clear—with a correlation of 86% (note 
the reported R2). A potential limitation of looking 
at correlations with traditional risk premiums in a 
portfolio of individual credit hedge funds is that any 
true idiosyncratic returns may be diversified away. 
To address this issue, we show in Panel A of Figure 3 
the same correlation for each individual fund. The 
frequency histogram suggests that the vast majority 
of credit fund excess-of-cash returns are strongly 
positively correlated with the Credit risk premium. 
The median correlation is 0.61.
To explore this issue further, we extended the set of 
traditional risk premiums that we wished to examine 
to include (1) the Credit risk premium (the credit 
excess returns from the ICE BAML US High Yield 
Master II Index, ticker H0A0), (2) the Equity risk 
premium (the excess-of-cash returns to the S&P 500 
Index), and (3) the Treasury risk premium (the excess-
of-cash returns from the ICE BAML US Treasuries 
7–10 Years Index, ticker G4O2). Table 2 reports 
annualized returns, Sharpe ratios, and correlations 
for these three traditional risk premiums for our 
sample. Panel A shows that all three traditional risk 
premiums have positive risk-adjusted returns. Panel B 
shows that the Credit and Equity risk premiums 
are strongly positively correlated and that both are 
negatively correlated with the Treasury risk premium 
in this time period.
Table 3 reports the results of regressing net-of-fee 
and net-of-cash credit hedge fund returns on the 
three traditional risk premiums (for overlapping 
three-month returns). Panel A reports results for 
individual credit hedge funds from the full sample 
of available overlapping three-month returns for 
each fund. Across our 219 credit hedge funds, we 
found that the average (median) hedge fund has 48% 
(49%) of its return variation explained by passive 
exposure to traditional market risk premiums. Clearly, 
a hidden beta is packaged as alpha within the set 
of credit hedge funds. Panel B reports regression 
results for the HFRI Relative Value: Fixed Income-
Corporate Index category returns against the market 
risk premiums. Passive exposure to the Credit risk 
premium alone explains 75% of the variation in credit 
hedge fund category returns, and all three traditional 
Figure 2. Aggregate Credit Exposure of 
Actively Managed Credit Funds, January 
1997–June 2018
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Notes: The overlapping three-month equal-weighted average 
excess-of-cash (excess-of-benchmark) returns for our sample 
of credit hedge (mutual) funds and the Credit risk premium 
were measured as the credit excess returns of the ICE BAML 
US High Yield Master II Index. The sample includes 219 (96) 
credit hedge (mutual) funds. 
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risk premiums combined explain 76% of the return 
variation. Notably, in the last specification reported 
in Panel B of Table 3, the intercept is 0.72 and is not 
significant [implying an alpha of 72 basis points (bps) 
annualized]. In results not reported in Table 3, across 
the set of 219 credit hedge funds, the mean (median) 
annualized regression intercept is 2.3 (1.3) with a 
corresponding t-statistic of 1.03 (0.94). Therefore, 
the annualized average excess-of-cash return of 
3.43% reported in Figure 1 is primarily explained 
by passive exposure to traditional risk premiums. 
Note that the regression intercept (alpha) is likely to 
understate true alpha because the included explana-
tory variables are gross of fees. These return series 
are relatively cheap to access, however, for most 
institutional investors. What appeared at first glance 
to be impressive net-of-fee returns compared with a 
cash benchmark have been significantly reduced by 
subtracting returns associated with passive exposure 
to traditional risk premiums. To be fair, an attractive 
risk-adjusted return still exists across the set of credit 
hedge funds. To make that clear, Figure 4, Panel A, 
shows the distribution of annualized net-of-fee and 
net-of-traditional-risk-premiums returns across the 
set of 219 credit hedge funds. What is striking about 
this graph is the large shift to the left in the distribu-
tion. Indeed, the average information ratio for the 
credit hedge funds is 0.48, and it is significantly 
smaller than the simple Sharpe ratio of 0.79 reported 
in Figure 1.
Our next objective was to assess whether credit 
hedge funds, both in aggregate and individually, 
provide exposure to well-compensated systematic 
investment themes. For this exercise, we first cap-
tured passive exposures to traditional risk premiums 
(via the overlapping three-month return regression 
Figure 3. Credit Exposure across Individual 
Actively Managed Credit Funds, January 
1997–June 2018
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Notes: The frequency histograms report contemporaneous 
correlations for each credit hedge (mutual) fund. Our sample 
covers 219 (96) credit hedge (mutual) funds. Returns are for 
overlapping three-month periods.
Table 2.  Traditional Market Risk Premiums, 
January 1997–June 2018
 Credit Treasury Equity
A. Summary statistics
Annual return 2.79% 3.01% 6.32%
Annual volatility 11.88% 5.92% 15.63%
Sharpe ratio 0.24 0.51 0.40
B. Return correlation matrix for full sample
Credit 1.00   
Treasury –0.49 1.00  
Equity 0.75 –0.44 1.00
Notes: Treasury and Equity correspond to returns on, respec-
tively, 10-year US Treasuries and the S&P 500 (both in excess 
of one-month Treasury returns). Credit is the return of the ICE 
BAML US High Yield Master II Index in excess of a Treasury 
portfolio with similar cash flows.
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Table 3.  Traditional Market Risk Premiums in Credit Fund Returns, 
January 1997–June 2018 (t-statistics in parentheses)
Hedge Funds Mutual Funds
A. Explanatory power of benchmarks for hedge funds and mutual funds
Average 48%  91%
Median 49  92
75th percentile 70  95
Maximum 96%  98%
 Credit Equity Treasury All
B. Explanatory power of benchmarks for HFRI Relative Value: Fixed Income-Corporate Index 
Credit 0.55   0.54
 (11.2)   (6.9)
Equity  0.33  0.04
  (5.3)  (0.6)
Treasury   –0.48 0.10
   (–3.1) (1.4)
Intercept (annual) 1.21 0.67 4.20 0.72
 (1.3) (0.5) (2.7) (0.9)
R2 75% 46% 14% 76%
Credit Equity Treasury All
C. Explanatory power of benchmarks for credit mutual fund index
Credit 0.75  0.84
(26.6)  (35.8)
Equity 0.43 0.03
 (7.0) (2.5)
Treasury  –0.40 0.46
  (–2.3) (14.4)
Intercept (annual) 1.38 0.76 4.68 –0.40
(2.3) (0.5) (2.4) (–1.3)
R2 91% 51% 6% 98%
Notes: In Panel A, for both credit hedge funds and mutual funds, the benchmark is specific to 
each of 219 hedge funds, estimated as a linear combination of equity, credit, and Treasury market 
returns with weights determined by a full-sample regression of fund returns on those three 
variables. In Panels B and C, Treasury is the excess-of-cash return on the ICE BAML US Treasuries 
7–10 Years Index, Equity is the excess-of-cash return on the S&P 500, and Credit is the credit 
excess return of the ICE BAML US High Yield Master II Index. 
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Figure 4. Distribution of Alpha across Individual Actively Managed Credit Funds, 
January 1997–June 2018
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Notes: Passive exposures to traditional market risk premiums were removed individually for each fund by using a full-sample 
regression of overlapping three-month net-of-fee and excess-of-cash returns on the Credit risk premium (Credit), Equity risk 
premium (Equity), and Treasury risk premium (Treasury). The sample is 219 (96) credit hedge (mutual) funds. The green line in 
each panel shows a normal distribution with mean of zero and standard deviation equal to that of the average return distribution. 
The table on the bottom shows the full-sample distributions of annualized alphas.
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described previously) and removed this component 
from the returns of each credit hedge fund. 
The remaining alpha was then regressed on the 
returns of long–short factor portfolios for the 
following systematic investment themes: value, 
momentum, carry, and defensive. We used the 
same measures as in prior research (see, e.g., 
Israel et al. 2018). Full descriptions of the measures 
are given in Appendix A. Previous research (e.g., 
Israel et al.) showed that these systematic themes 
deliver positive risk-adjusted returns without provid-
ing exposure to traditional market risk premiums. 
In Table 4, Panels A, B, and C report the results of 
this regression as an average across credit hedge 
funds. In these three panels, only limited evidence is 
provided that credit hedge fund returns are associ-
ated with systematic investment themes, either 
individually or jointly. Collectively, the four system-
atic investment themes explain between 7% and 
12% of the variation in aggregate credit hedge fund 
excess returns.
A limitation of the previous analysis of aggregate 
credit hedge fund returns is that the performance of 
individual credit hedge funds that provided mini-
mal exposure to traditional risk premiums and/or 
maximal exposure to systematic investment themes 
could be “drowned out” by the average manager. 
Figure 5, Panel A, therefore, displays the distribution 
Table 4.  Credit Fund Index Exposure to Characteristics, January 1997–
June 2018 (t-statistics in parentheses)
Value Momentum Carry Defensive All
A. Credit hedge fund HFRI market-adjusted return
Value 0.06 –0.06
 (1.4) (–0.6)
Momentum  –0.05  0.05
  (–0.8)  (0.6)
Carry  0.08  0.22
 (1.6)  (2.0)
Defensive  0.13 0.21
  (1.0) (1.7)
Intercept (annual) 0.36 1.10 0.72 0.18 –0.25
(0.4) (1.4) (0.9) (0.3) (–0.2)
R2 1.39% 0.88% 2.96% 3.70% 11.66%
B. Market-adjusted return for credit hedge fund US-centric corporate index (equal weighted)
Value 0.06 0.09
 (1.5)  (1.2)
Momentum  0.01  0.08
  (0.3)  (1.3)
Carry  0.03  0.06
 (0.6)  (0.6)
Defensive  0.08 0.11
 (1.2) (1.7)
Intercept (annual) 2.34 2.58 2.70 2.34 1.04
(3.2) (4.8) (4.2) (4.1) (1.7)
R2 2.40% 0.15% 0.47% 2.81% 8.85%
(continued)
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of t-statistics across our set of 219 credit hedge 
funds. The t-statistic for a given systematic exposure 
was estimated separately by using the full sample 
of returns for each credit hedge fund. The dotted 
line is a normal distribution, and the solid line is the 
empirical distribution. The probability densities of 
the t-statistics are similar to those for the aggregate 
credit hedge fund results in Table 4; only marginal 
evidence is seen of credit hedge funds tilting toward 
the value, momentum, and defensive themes. In 
unreported results, we also tested whether the dis-
tribution of t-statistics across managers is different 
from the standard normal (which is what we would 
expect if their true exposure was zero and sample 
sizes were not an issue). We could reject the null 
hypothesis for value, momentum, and defensive, but 
Value Momentum Carry Defensive All
C. Credit hedge fund US-centric corporate index market-adjusted return (asset weighted)
Value 0.01  0.03
 (0.2) (0.6)
Momentum  0.02  0.04
  (0.7)  (0.6)
Carry  –0.01  0.02
 (–0.3)  (0.3)
Defensive  0.11 0.12
  (1.5) (1.9)
Intercept (annual) 1.33 1.20 1.39 0.91 0.35
(1.9) (1.9) (2.3) (1.8) (0.4)
R2 0.10% 0.45% 0.16% 5.81% 7.04%
D. Credit mutual fund index market-adjusted return  
Value 0.01   –0.01
 (0.4) (–0.2)
Momentum  –0.02  –0.01
  (–0.6)  (–0.3)
Carry  0.02  0.01
 (0.7)  (0.4)
Defensive  –0.02 –0.02
  (–0.5) (–0.3)
Intercept (annual) –0.47 –0.25 –0.40 –0.29 –0.21
(–1.4) (–0.8) (–1.4) (–1.2) (–0.5)
R2 0.32% 0.83% 0.99% 0.86% 1.50%
Notes: The index used in Panel A is the HFRI Relative Value: Fixed Income-Corporate Index. The index 
used in Panel B is an equal-weighted average of our 219 US-centric credit hedge funds from the HFRI. 
The index used in Panel C is an asset-weighted average of our 219 US-centric credit hedge funds from 
the HFRI. The index used in Panel D is an equal-weighted average of the 96 corporate bond mutual 
funds in our Morningstar sample. Market-adjusted return is the difference between the excess-of-cash 
return of each credit fund and a market-hedging portfolio. The hedging portfolio is a linear combina-
tion of Equity, Credit, and Treasury market returns, where the weight was determined by a full-sample 
regression of fund returns on those three market returns.
Table 4.  Credit Fund Index Exposure to Characteristics, January 1997–
June 2018 (t-statistics in parentheses) (continued)
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Figure 5. Systematic 
Factor Exposures 
across Individual 
Actively Managed 
Credit Funds, January 
1997–June 2018
A. Credit Hedge Fund: Value
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
–6 –4 –2 0 2 4
PDF Normal (0,1)
B. Credit Mutual Fund: Value
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
–6 –4 –2 0 2 4
C. Credit Hedge Fund: Momentum
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
–6 –4 –2 0 2 4
D. Credit Mutual Fund: Momentum
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
–6 –4 –2 0 2 4
E. Credit Hedge Fund: Carry
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
–6 –4 –2 0 2 4
F. Credit Mutual Fund: Carry
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
–6 –4 –2 0 2 4
G. Credit Hedge Fund: Defensive
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
–6 –4 –2 0 2 4
H. Credit Mutual Fund: Defensive
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
–6 –4 –2 0 2 4
6 6
6 6
6 6
6 6
Probability Probability
Probability Probability
Probability Probability
Probability Probability
Notes: PDF is the probability density function. Empirical densities are given of the cross-
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returns, where the weight was determined by a full-sample regression of fund returns on those 
three market returns.
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the economic magnitude of these tilts is small. We 
interpret the results in Table 4 and Figure 5 as show-
ing that credit hedge funds, in aggregate and indi-
vidually, have only limited exposure to these themes.
Detailed Return Analysis of HY Credit 
Long-Only Funds. Our methodology for analyz-
ing actively managed credit long-only mutual funds 
largely followed that for the credit hedge funds. 
We continued to use overlapping three-month 
returns to mitigate issues related to stale pricing 
and return measurement. First, we examined the 
exposure of the long-only funds to the Credit risk 
premium. Unlike a hedge fund, however, a long-only 
mutual fund is meant to provide exposure to the risk 
premium embedded in the benchmark. So, Table 3, 
Panel A, naturally shows that the average credit 
mutual fund has 91% of its return variation attribut-
able to the Credit risk premium. But to what extent 
does that result reflect a full capture of the Credit 
risk premium? Figure 2, Panel B, is a scatterplot 
showing the contemporaneous correlation between 
the excess-of-benchmark (and net-of-fee) returns 
of an equally weighted basket of actively managed 
credit mutual funds and the credit excess returns of 
a diversified HY corporate bond index (both mea-
sured by using overlapping three-month returns). 
In contrast to the credit hedge fund results shown 
in Panel A of Figure 2, a negative correlation of 45% 
is clearly visible. Long-only active credit managers 
provide less credit exposure, on average, than their 
benchmarks. We achieved similar results by look-
ing at individual credit mutual funds in Panel B of 
Figure 3. The frequency histogram suggests that 
the vast majority of credit mutual fund excess-of-
benchmark returns are negatively correlated with the 
Credit risk premium. The median correlation is –0.3. 
An important aspect is that these correlations were 
based on the full sample of returns and hence reflect 
a strategic allocation choice. We are not talking 
about temporal variation in the exposure to credit 
markets that may coincide with market performance. 
Therefore, this static (strategic) underexposure to 
credit markets may, in part, explain the negative 
net-of-fee returns documented in Panel B of Figure 1. 
Over the 1997–2018 period, the credit excess return 
from a broad diversified HY benchmark was nearly 
3% annualized. Failing to capture that return fully in 
a portfolio created a meaningful headwind for the 
manager when returns were compared with those of 
the benchmark.
Panel C of Table 3 reports regression results docu-
menting the extent to which traditional market 
risk premiums explain aggregate credit mutual 
fund returns. Similar to what we did for the hedge 
funds, we regressed net-of-fee and excess-of-cash 
aggregate credit mutual fund returns on the three 
traditional risk premiums by using overlapping 
three-month returns. Panel C of Table 3 shows that 
traditional market risk premiums, primarily the Credit 
risk premium, explain more than 90% of the variation 
of aggregate credit mutual fund returns. The regres-
sion coefficient of 0.75 suggests a lower beta than 
that implied in Panel B of Figure 2. The reason for 
this difference is that in Panel B of Figure 2, excess-
of-benchmark returns were computed relative to the 
stated benchmark for each mutual fund. Given that 
some funds had safer (BB/B) HY benchmarks than 
others, the regression in Panel C of Table 3 included 
a broad HY index that contained riskier bonds. The 
result is a lower estimated aggregate credit mutual 
fund beta.
To visualize the impact of controlling for passive 
beta, Figure 4, Panel B, illustrates the annualized net-
of-fee, excess-of-cash, and excess-of-passive-beta 
(i.e., alpha) returns across our 96 individual credit 
mutual funds. In contrast to the credit hedge fund 
results, the return distribution here is shifted slightly 
to the right. The reason is that individual credit 
mutual funds had less than unit exposure to the 
Credit risk premium, which delivered a robust risk-
adjusted return in our sample period. Note that the 
average information ratio across funds improved to 
zero (Figure 4) from –0.34 (Figure 1) and the average 
annualized excess-of-benchmark return of –0.95% 
improved to –0.21%.
We next examined whether credit mutual funds, 
both in aggregate and individually, provide exposure 
to well-compensated systematic investment themes. 
We ran the same overlapping three-month regres-
sion analyses as described in the section “Detailed 
Return Analysis of Credit Hedge Funds.” We first 
measured the alpha for each credit mutual fund by 
regressing its net-of-fee and net-of-cash return on 
the three traditional risk premiums; we removed 
this passive beta component of returns from each 
credit mutual fund. Panel D of Table 4 reports 
results for an equal-weighted aggregate of credit 
mutual funds. It contains no evidence of significant 
exposure in these funds—either individually or in 
aggregate—to any of the systematic investment 
themes. In aggregate, the four themes explain only 
2% of the variation in aggregate credit mutual fund 
excess returns. 
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Turning to the 96 individual credit mutual funds, 
Panels B, D, F, and H of Figure 5 show the distri-
bution of t-statistics reflecting exposure to each 
individual theme. The results here are similar to the 
aggregate result—little evidence of individual credit 
mutual funds having exposure to the systematic 
investment themes. Unreported Kolmogorov–
Smirnov tests rejected the null hypothesis that the 
empirical t-statistic distribution follows a standard 
normal only for carry, but again the economic mag-
nitude of this tilt is small. We interpret the results in 
Table 4 and Figure 5 as showing that credit mutual 
funds, in aggregate and individually, have virtually no 
exposure to systematic investment themes.
Holdings Analysis of HY Credit Long-Only 
Funds. Our final, and arguably most powerful, 
analysis to detect exposure to systematic investment 
themes entailed examining bond-level portfolio hold-
ings data for a broad set of credit mutual funds. For 
this analysis, we used quarterly reports from Lipper 
eMAXX for our 154 funds, which yielded a sample of 
5,536 fund-quarter reports for the 1998–2018 time 
period. We computed active weights for each fund-
quarter by finding the difference between the weight 
of a given corporate bond in the fund and the weight 
of that bond in the respective fund benchmark. We 
then used these active weights to assess exposure to 
systematic investment themes. 
For this exercise, we measured each bond’s attrac-
tiveness across the four systematic investment 
themes. At the end of each filing quarter, we assigned 
all constituent bonds in the ICE BAML US High 
Yield Master II Index a standardized score across 
the four systematic themes. We then computed for 
each fund-quarter the correlation between active 
weights and this standardized measure. This correla-
tion summary statistic captures the extent to which 
a credit fund’s overweights were consistent with a 
given systematic investment theme. The correlation 
can also be interpreted as a transfer coefficient (TC) 
when the asset-by-asset covariance matrix is propor-
tional to an identity matrix (see, e.g., Clarke, de Silva, 
and Thorley 2002). Henceforth, we will refer to this 
cross-sectional correlation as TC for simplicity. 
A negative TC for a certain style means that the 
fund is shorting that style, a zero TC means that 
the fund has no exposure to the style, and a TC of 
1 means that the fund is maximally exposed to the 
style. As discussed in Clarke et al. (2002), a TC of 1 
is highly unlikely because even if the manager uses 
a certain style as its sole measure of alpha, portfolio 
constraints (such as no shorting, leverage limits, 
and transaction costs) can drive the TC below 1. To 
provide a more realistic benchmark, we also included 
in our analysis a hypothetical long-only fund that 
explicitly targeted exposures to a risk-balanced com-
bination of the four systematic investment themes. 
This hypothetical long-only fund is included in the 
histograms in Figure 6. The full details of the linear 
program underpinning this long-only portfolio is 
described in Israel et al. (2018), and the most perti-
nent details are summarized in Appendix B.
Panel A of Table 5 provides the global average TC 
across all funds and quarters. The average TC across 
all four systematic investment themes is positive. 
Note that, although statistically different from zero, 
however, the TCs are economically close to zero. In 
Panel B, we saw a similar result when we regressed 
active weights directly on the standardized mea-
sures. This regression was run for each fund-quarter 
and then averaged across fund-quarters. Again, 
although a directionally positive and statistically 
significant association is visible for momentum, carry, 
and defensive, the magnitude of these coefficients 
suggests tiny average active weight exposures. For 
example, a 1 standard deviation increase in the 
attractiveness of a corporate bond based on our 
standardized measure of carry is associated with a 
1.4 bp larger active weight on that corporate bond. 
The average R2 from the regressions reported in 
Panel B of Table 5 is 2%, and the maximum is 6%. 
Even if we consider systematic exposures jointly, 
we see little evidence that the average credit 
manager targets these systematic exposures. This 
result may not be surprising if we assume that 
the set of actively managed credit mutual funds is 
representative of the market. (As of the end of our 
sample period, about 25% of the outstanding HY 
corporate debt was held by mutual funds.) Investing 
is a zero-sum game, so the average TC should be 
close to zero.
What is most interesting is the distribution of TCs 
across credit mutual funds. We show the relevant 
frequency histograms in Figure 6. The vertical orange 
line corresponds to the average value shown in Panel 
A of Table 5. It is striking how concentrated the dis-
tribution of TCs is around zero for all four systematic 
investment themes. The largest TCs among the vari-
ous funds are around 0.15. The TCs for the hypotheti-
cal systematic portfolios (the blue vertical lines) are far 
from 1 but much larger than the typical active credit 
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fund, showing that active current managers have little 
exposure to systematic investment themes.
To help make that point clear, Figure 7 contains an 
alternative visualization of the differences between 
exposures to systematic investment themes for 
actively managed credit mutual funds and the 
hypothetical systematic portfolio. To construct 
Figure 7, we assigned to every constituent bond in 
the HY index a score that describes its combined 
attractiveness vis-à-vis the four systematic themes. 
We then sorted the constituent bonds on this 
composite score from most to least attractive and 
assigned them to quartiles. For each fund-quarter, 
we then summed up the portfolio weights across 
the four attractiveness quartiles. The bar on the left 
in Figure 7 is the average across all credit mutual 
funds, and the bar on the right is for the hypothetical 
systematic portfolio.
Consistent with the analysis in Figure 6, Figure 7 
provides no evidence of portfolio tilts toward well-
compensated systematic investment themes in these 
actively managed credit funds. This statement is not 
to say that actively managed credit funds take no 
risk or that they are ignorant about how active risk 
is taken. Rather, we simply suggest that systematic 
investment approaches are different from traditional 
discretionary ones. This difference is important 
because it is a potential source of diversification ben-
efit. What is also true of the hypothetical long-only 
systematic portfolio is that it is designed to deliver a 
beta of 1 with respect to the HY benchmark, unlike 
the actively managed credit funds, which, as we 
showed earlier, had too little exposure to the bench-
mark itself. This combination of a full capture of the 
Credit risk premium and a set of systematic expo-
sures that do not contain exposure to traditional risk 
premiums is a potentially powerful complement to an 
investor’s portfolio.
General Discussion of Systematic 
Credit Investing
The purpose of this section is to help define what 
“systematic credit investing” is—and what it is not. 
The empirical analysis in this article used relatively 
Figure 6. Average Correlation of Individual Actively Managed Mutual Funds with Systematic 
Investment Themes, January 1997–June 2018 
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Notes: The figure shows the full-sample average correlations of each credit mutual fund with systematic investment themes. 
The sample consists of 154 high-yield mutual funds. The orange line in each graph shows the cross-sectional average correlation, 
and the blue line shows the average correlation for a hypothetical long-only portfolio designed to maximize exposure to the four 
systematic investment themes. The TC for a given fund-quarter was computed as the cross-sectional correlation between fund 
active weights and standardized measures representative of each investment theme. 
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simple measures and simple portfolio construction 
techniques. These choices help ensure the transpar-
ency and full replicability of our results. Generally, 
however, systematic investing need not be limited to 
simple measures. Indeed, systematic credit investing 
is a fundamentally driven, yet systematically imple-
mented, approach to portfolio construction. Good 
fundamental analysts are not going to limit them-
selves to the simplest financial statement ratios to 
assess default risk, nor should a systematic approach 
be limited. Systematic investing need not imply a 
“smart beta” approach.
Because most academic research has been con-
ducted on cross-sectional drivers of equity returns, 
scores of investment products have been designed 
to harvest these return drivers (typically described 
as “factors,” “styles,” or “smart beta”). To the extent 
that measures are well known and understood (and 
there is general agreement as to their implementa-
tion), to label systematic harvesting of the return 
drivers as factor- or style-based investing is fine. 
For credit markets, however, we believe that to 
label systematic harvesting of recently documented 
cross-sectional drivers of credit excess returns as 
factor or style investing is premature. First, few asset 
managers have a truly systematic approach in credit 
markets (indeed, such is the point of this article). 
Second, we have not reached a clear agreement on 
how various attributes should be measured (e.g., 
how to model default). Third, the credit markets 
are far more challenging than the equity markets 
for trading or for building a portfolio that system-
atically targets exposures to desirable attributes. 
Indeed, our analysis suggests that even with simple 
measures of systematic themes (value, momentum, 
carry, and defensive), little of the active credit fund 
manager returns or holdings can be explained with a 
systematic approach. For equity funds, in contrast, 
academic research examining style exposures goes 
as far back as Brown and Goetzmann (1997); Carhart 
(1997); and Chan, Chen, and Lakonishok (2002). 
These authors generally found that simple factors 
have significant explanatory power for both equity 
fund returns and holdings, especially when looking 
at equity funds in the standard Morningstar cat-
egories. This difference between credit and equity 
funds is partly a result of the general acceptance and 
broad use of equity style measures by fund manag-
ers as well as by entities that create categories for 
equity funds, such as Morningstar. In the future, 
we expect to see increasing acceptance and use of 
systematic investing approaches in credit markets; 
therefore, our tests might produce different results 
in future years.
For this article, we used measures of value, momen-
tum, carry, and defensive factors as defined in Israel 
et al. (2018). Although this approach has the primary 
benefits of transparency and replicability, it comes 
with a potential cost in that it is naturally limited 
and may not reflect the depth of analysis (measures 
and portfolio construction choices) being applied in 
actual (proprietary) portfolios.
Table 5.  Analysis of HY Mutual Fund 
Holdings, January 1997–June 
2018 (t-statistics in parentheses)
 Correlation (TC)
A. Active weight correlation of mutual funds with 
systematic investment themes
Value 0.01
 (2.6)
Momentum 0.02
 (10.1)
Carry 0.04
 (6.9)
Defensive 0.03
 (6.7)
 
Dependent Variable: 
Active Weight (bps)
B. Average loadings from regressions of mutual fund 
holdings on systematic investment themes
Value –0.19
 (–0.9)
Momentum 0.47
 (5.2)
Carry 1.42
 (8.6)
Defensive 0.93
 (13.8)
Notes: Distribution of quantities of interest are given for 5,536 
mutual fund reports by 154 unique HY credit mutual funds. 
The 154 funds had portfolio holding information contained in 
the Lipper eMAXX database, and these funds have an explicit 
high-yield benchmark belonging to one of the two most popu-
lar benchmark providers: BAML and Barclays. Active weights 
are weights in excess of the respective benchmark for each 
fund. Note that t-statistics of the averages are clustered at the 
fund and quarter levels.
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Conclusion
We undertook a comprehensive analysis of the behav-
ior of actively managed credit hedge funds and mutual 
funds. We asked a simple question: Do actively 
managed credit funds deliver active returns that are 
uncorrelated with traditional market risk premiums? 
We found limited evidence in support of this idea. 
First, credit hedge funds provide meaningful expo-
sure to the Credit risk premium, and that exposure 
may be more than the funds’ investors expect 
(around half of the return variation is explained by 
credit beta). Just as equity hedge funds have been 
shown to have significant passive exposure to the 
equity market, we found a strong footprint of passive 
exposure to credit beta in credit hedge funds. Credit 
mutual funds, in contrast, provide too little exposure 
to the Credit risk premium. They are, in effect, creat-
ing a headwind for themselves. Given the existence 
of a risk premium from exposure to credit-sensitive 
assets (see, e.g., Asvanunt and Richardson 2017), this 
headwind may help explain the negative net-of-fee 
returns for credit mutual funds.
Second, despite evidence of (1) a robust relationship 
between well-known systematic investment themes 
(i.e., value, momentum, carry, and defensive) and cor-
porate bond excess returns and (2) the feasibility of 
implementing exposures to these themes, individual 
credit funds are only minimally exposed to themes 
that generate meaningfully positive risk-adjusted 
returns. Investors in actively managed credit funds 
should be aware of the beta they are exposed to (too 
much in credit hedge funds and too little in credit 
mutual funds) and the lack of exposure to systematic 
investment themes. Our results suggest that credit 
investors may have an opportunity to gain exposure 
to well-compensated investment themes that will 
diversify their holdings and complement their expo-
sure to traditional market risk premiums.
Figure 7. Average 
Credit Mutual Fund 
Holdings Divided into 
Quartiles Based on 
Systematic Investment 
Theme Scores, as of 
30 June 2018
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Notes: Quartiles are based on combined scores across all four systematic themes (value, momen-
tum, carry, and defensive). The hypothetical long-only HY portfolio was designed to maximize 
exposure to the four systematic investment themes. 
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Appendix A. Variable Definitions and Details
Variable Definition
Treasury Excess returns to long-term government bonds, measured as the difference between total 
returns on the ICE BAML US Treasuries 7–10 Years Index (ticker G4O2) and one-month 
US T-bills, sampled at a rolling quarterly frequency.
Credit Excess returns to corporate bonds, measured as the difference between the return of the 
ICE BAML US High Yield Master II Index (ticker H0A0) and a portfolio of US T-bonds 
with similar cash flows, sampled at a rolling quarterly frequency.
Equity Excess returns to the S&P 500 Index, measured as the difference between total returns 
to the S&P 500 and one-month US T-bills, sampled at a rolling quarterly frequency.
Active weight Bond weight in excess of the stated benchmark for a given mutual fund.
Correlation (transfer 
coefficient)
The cross-sectional correlation of fund manager active weights and standardized scores 
across the respective systematic investment themes. The correlation was measured for 
each fund-quarter and can be averaged across both funds and time.
Market-adjusted 
returns
Returns in excess of traditional market risk premiums, measured as the difference 
between the returns of a credit fund and a fund-specific market-hedging portfolio 
(MHP). The MHP was determined by a full-sample regression of a credit fund’s excess-
of-cash return on the returns of traditional market risk premiums (Credit, Equity, and 
Treasury)—all sampled at a rolling quarterly frequency.
Carry A long–short portfolio targeting exposure to the carry investment theme, measured by 
option-adjusted spread (OAS) as reported in the BAML bond database. This portfolio 
was long (short) the top (bottom) 20% of bonds each month, and returns were value 
weighted. Reported returns are credit excess returns.
Value A long–short portfolio targeting exposure to the value investment theme. Value was mea-
sured by two fair value regressions: first, as the residual from a cross-sectional regres-
sion of the log of OAS on the log of duration, rating, and bond excess return volatility 
(prior 12 months); second, as the residual from a cross-sectional regression of the log 
of OAS on the log of the default probability implied by a structural model (for details, 
see Shumway 2001). To obtain a beta-neutral long–short value portfolio, we demeaned 
value within five ex ante beta quintiles, with beta being measured as spread duration 
times spread (DTS). This portfolio was long (short) the top (bottom) 20% of bonds each 
month, and returns were value weighted. Reported returns are credit excess returns.
Momentum A long–short portfolio targeting exposure to the momentum investment theme. 
Momentum was measured by two price-based measures. The first was credit momen-
tum from the most recent six-month cumulative corporate bond excess return. The 
second was equity momentum, defined as the most recent six-month cumulative issuer 
equity return. To obtain a beta-neutral long–short momentum portfolio, we demeaned 
momentum within five ex ante beta quintiles, with beta being measured as spread DTS. 
This portfolio was long (short) the top (bottom) 20% of bonds each month, and returns 
were value weighted. Reported returns are credit excess returns.
Defensive A long–short portfolio targeting exposure to the defensive investment theme. Defensive 
was the combination of three measures: The first was market leverage, measured as the 
ratio of net debt (book debt + minority interest + preferred stocks – cash) to the sum of 
net debt and market capitalization. This measure used data available at the start of each 
month (assuming a six-month lag for the release of financial statement information). The 
defensive theme avoids issuers with high levels of leverage. The second measure was 
effective duration as reported in the BAML bond database. The defensive theme avoids 
issues with long duration. The third measure was gross profitability measured as gross 
profits scaled by average total assets. The defensive theme favors issuers with high lev-
els of profitability. This portfolio was long (short) the top (bottom) 20% of bonds each 
month, and returns were value weighted. Reported returns are credit excess returns.
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Appendix B. Long-Only Portfolio 
Implementation Details
To construct a long-only portfolio with maximal 
exposure to our selected systematic investment themes 
(value, momentum, carry, and defensive), we ran a 
linear program every month. The mathematical details 
of that linear program are given here. The objective 
was to select portfolio weights that were maximally 
correlated with a combined score (COMBO). COMBO 
is an equal-risk-weighted combination of the value, 
momentum, carry, and defensive characteristics for a 
given bond. The index used was the ICE BAML US High 
Yield Master II Index. We selected one representative 
bond per issuer (for details, see Israel et al. 2018). This 
process created a universe of 500–600 issuers each 
month that were both liquid and nondistressed. The 
constraints ensured that our portfolio of HY corporate 
bonds (1) was fully invested, (2) was long only (i.e., 
shorting was disallowed), (3) maintained a beta close 
to 1 via the spread duration and spread active weight 
deviations, and (4) was liquidity aware because of 
limited turnover and trading only in minimal sizes. In 
the notation below, wi,t is the optimal portfolio weight 
on bond i, bi,t is the weight of bond i on a cap-weighted 
portfolio of bonds in our universe, ri,t is the (cum-
coupon) return of bond i at date t, ci,t is the coupon paid 
by bond i at date t as a percentage of the bond market 
value at date t – 1, and
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r c
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is the weight bond i has on the portfolio at date t before 
any rebalancing.
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w bi t i t i ti
I
, , , .− ⋅( ) ≤=∑ Duration1 0 50 (deviation from 
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Notes
 1. Prior research examining popular active fixed-income 
categories (e.g., global aggregate, US core, and core plus) 
has documented a pervasive overweight to credit markets. 
Specifically, AQR Capital Management (2018) showed 
that the excess-of-benchmark returns of global aggregate 
(core plus) managers have a 0.76 (0.95) correlation with the 
Credit risk premium. The key difference in the directional-
ity of the weighting to the Credit risk premium lies in the 
risk of the respective benchmark. Unlike managers in other 
categories, HY managers cannot enhance returns by add-
ing persistent out-of-benchmark exposures to risky credit. 
The lower beta for HY managers is probably attributable 
to a combination of (1) an inability to invest 100% in corpo-
rate bonds (remember that credit mutual funds are holding 
relatively less liquid assets inside a daily dealing vehicle 
and are, therefore, likely to hold cash in the fund) and (2) a 
possible desire to hold safer bonds and avoid defaults.
2. Of course, there is always the possibility of market timing, 
the subject of an extensive literature. Market timing is not 
the focus of this article, but we note that the persistence 
of beta mismatch in both credit hedge funds and credit 
mutual funds is inconsistent with an attempt to time the 
market, let alone a demonstration of skill in such timing.
3. Refer to Appendix A for definitions.
4. We also ran our analysis on a less restrictive sample—one 
without the filter of at least 80% of the portfolio being 
held in corporate bonds. This process created a sample 
of 146 actively managed credit funds. The broader set of 
funds captured 85% of the total assets managed by credit 
mutual funds in the Morningstar Direct database. Our 
results are similar for this alternative sample (i.e., too little 
beta and too little systematic exposure). We prefer the 
returns analysis to be based on the reduced sample, how-
ever, because it allows for cleaner inference. For example, 
in the larger sample, a failure to find evidence of system-
atic exposures could be criticized because the excluded 
assets (e.g., loans and equities) might distort any credit 
beta or systematic credit exposures from the corporate 
bond portion of the portfolio.
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